In an opinion that literally will be discussed around the globe, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ordered the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to reconsider its decision not to regulate greenhouse gases under the federal Clean Air Act. The Court concluded that EPA rejected such regulation on grounds not supported by the Act. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, in addressing the issue that has been of great controversy between the press, Congress, and the White House, as well as among nations around the world, the highest court in the land ruled that scientific evidence supports the conclusion that human generated greenhouse gases are contributing to global warming and climate change and that the EPA was acting arbitrarily and not consistent with the law in refusing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
The global nature of the problem presented a major legal obstacle for the State of Massachusetts in the case. The question was whether the plaintiff could show that the harm it sought to remedy would be direct and causally related to the greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles that could be reduced if EPA had acted to regulate them. In his dissent, the Chief Justice argued this was pure speculation. However, the majority of the justices ruled that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the decision by EPA under the Clean Air Act not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.
The Court ruled that Massachusetts owns coastal lands that are currently being and are predicted to be further swallowed by rising sea levels. In demonstrating one has standing to challenge an administrative agency decision, it is generally necessary to show an injury, causation, and redressability (the ability of the court to remedy the injury of the plaintiff). In considering this issued, the Court concluded that the states have special standing in the federal courts. In addition, Justice Breyer, who wrote the opinion, pointed out that a party to whom Congress has provided a procedural right can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. In this instance, the Court ruled that Congress had afforded the right to challenge in court a decision by EPA whether to regulate pollution from vehicles.
The first hurdle was for Massachusetts to show that it suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent. The majority ruled that the encroachment of rising sea levels on the coastline of Massachusetts was occurring and would occur so that the State met its requirements to show the harm is actual and imminent.
In terms of causation, the majority concluded that EPA did not dispute the existence of a causal connection between human emissions of greenhouse gases and global warming. It then ruled that the failure to regulate these emissions contributes to Massachusetts’ injuries. Here the issue, later challenged by dissenting Justices Roberts and Scalia, was whether that the reduction of greenhouse gases from US vehicles would in fact reduce any coastal flooding if China and India increase their emissions. The majority concluded that, regardless of the emissions from China and India, any significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would reduce coastal flooding—in essence identifying a linear relationship between emissions and the harm caused.
The majority ruled that the reductions would slow even though they would not reverse rising sea levels and, therefore, reduce the injury to Massachusetts. The court noted that EPA has taken the position that greenhouse gas emission should be reduced through voluntary measures, thus making it difficult for the Agency to conclude there was no causal relationship between the emissions and environmental harm--otherwise why would the Agency advocate reductions in emissions.
Having decided that Massachusetts has the right to challenge EPA’s decision to not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the Court then turned to a review of the basis of EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. EPA has refused to promulgate limits on greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles after receiving a petition from private parties requesting that EPA act to limit such emissions. In reviewing this decision, the Court applied what is known as the “arbitrary and capricious standard”. This standard of review under the Clean Air Act provides that the Court "may reverse any such actions to be found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."
The provision at issue in the case involved the EPA's role in regulating pollution from vehicles. The Clean Air Act states that EPA "shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in the [Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may be reasonably anticipated to endanger pubic health or welfare."
EPA’s logic in its decision not to regulate greenhouse gases was first that greenhouse gases do not fit within the definition of an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act. The Court interpreted the definition of air pollutant to include any air pollution agent, and that any physical, chemical, substance emitted into the ambient air could be considered an air pollutant. The definition was deemed broad enough to include carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that cause global warming.
EPA also stated in its explanation for its decision that even if it could regulate greenhouse gas emissions, it would not be appropriate to do so for two reasons. First, the President had decided to use voluntary standards to accomplish the reduction of greenhouse gases. Second, the issuance of regulations by EPA would detract from the President’s negotiations with developing nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The Court ruled that EPA’s explanation did not constitute a reasoned basis for refusing to form a scientific judgment on the question of whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. It further ruled that the Agency cannot avoid its statutory duty to reach a decision whether greenhouse gases cause global warming based on scientific uncertainties about certain aspects of climate change. “If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment, it must say so.” The court ruled that EPA’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
In its opinion, the Court appeared to be influenced by certain EPA decisions. One of the primary issues affecting the decision was that historically EPA had concluded that it in fact had the authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases. The other issue was the fact that EPA and the President have taken the position that greenhouse gases and climate change were serious issues and voluntary measures should be taken to reduce these emissions. This decision appeared to color the Court’s decision that there was a sufficient causal link between greenhouse gas emissions and the harm currently being caused by global warming and future predicted harm.
Ultimately, the Court remanded the decision not to regulate these emissions from vehicles to EPA to base its decision on factors permitted by the Clean Air Act. The result of this decision is that EPA now does not necessarily have to decide to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles, but it must reconsider its decision and base it on the legislative requirements.
In addition to affecting EPA's decision regarding vehicle emissions, this case has implications for vehicle manufacturers in another set of cases in which they have challenged limitations on greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles enacted by California and other states. The Supreme Court decision may bolster those states cases that they should have the power to regulate emissions from automobiles.
The more symbolic importance of the case is the ruling of the highest court in the United States that “the harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.” The Court further agreed with Massachusetts that “A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what else happens.” Such a ruling of cause and effect by the US Supreme Court may significantly increase public support for congressional action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and embolden members of Congress seeking action on climate change.
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